

ICT Vulnerabilities of the power grid: trade-offs of reviewing vs. upgrading current control architectures

Alberto Stefanini, Marcelo Masera, EC – DG JRC and R. Matthew Gardner, INPG



ICT architectures and networked critical infrastructures

- Industrial + business applications
 - Different environments: real-time, office
 - Many interconnections
 - Multi-proprietary
 - Legacy + new applications
- Across jurisdictions
 - Several actors (owners, designers, operators)
- Therefore:
 - Important dependability and security concerns
 - But, who owns the problem?




Evolution of the power infrastructure

Growing vulnerability

- Liberalisation and integration of EU energy market:
 - Demand is growing and cannot be easily faced anytime
 - Transactions increase operators forced to use grid capacity to the limit
 - Control system complexity grows responsibilities are being partitioned among a growing number of different subjects
- Emergence of cyber threats:
 - due to extended use of open IC infrastructures




The E+I paradigm



- The electric power infrastructure is information-based:
 - Within each company: operations, maintenance...
 - In relation with customers: energy information services...
 - Among companies: congestion, contingencies...
 - In the electricity market



Example: power plant





The GRID project (2006-2007)

- Establish consensus at the European level on the key issues involved in ICT vulnerabilities in power systems
 - Roadmap on most urgent and significant R&D needs
 - Raise awareness on security concerns
- Methodology: Dialogue with stakeholders
 - Regulators, transmission system operators, electric utilities, R&D institutions, manufacturers
 - Representative associations (Eurelectric, UCTE, ETSO)
 - National authorities and European Commission




GRID steps

- Stakeholders Conference
 - Stavanger, Norway on June 15, 2006
- Questionnaire for consultation of Stakeholders
- Workshops:
 - Leuven (B) November 14, 2006
 - Paris (F), June 20, 2007



The Questionnaire

- Diffused July 2006 to:
 - Approximately 600 members of industry and research
- 57 total responses (~10%)
 - 35 industry
 - 22 research
- 19 countries represented
 - 18 European countries
 - United States






The questionnaire: focus on ICT dependent functions

Rank (0-3) the key ICT dependent functions of power systems concerning *criticality* and *vulnerability*:

- Measurements
- Protection
- Monitoring
- Control
- System Management and Coordination
- Operator Decision Support




Criticality Response





Vulnerability Response






The questionnaire: emphasis areas

For increasing the robustness of the power system put emphasis (0-3) on:

- Risk and Vulnerability Assessment Tools and Methods
- Redesign of Control Architectures and Technologies
- Upgrading Control Architectures and Technologies
- Modeling and Simulation Tools
- Regulations
- Procedures
- Risk Scenarios
- Education on Risk
- Technologies



Emphasis Response



Emphasis Area



Questionnaire outcome

- What level of ICT based control and protection can be deployed?
 - Redundant/reliable exchange of data among TSOs
 - Software testing
 - Communication diagnostics/interference detection
 - Holistic security assessment tools & methods
- Simulation of critical situations over the whole of Europe
- Development of a framework of laws, procedures, and standards for ICT security



Questionnaire outcome vs Stavanger

Stavanger Conference focus:

- massive adoption of emergent technologies
 - likely to introduce enhanced cyber problems
 - · enormous amount and flow of data
 - need to integrate those and made the situation intelligible

Questionnaire:

- Control Redesign is considered the last workable option
- Control Update preferred



Questionnaire vs Stavanger (ct.)

- Stavanger:
 - paradigmatic shift in the way the EMS architecture is organised
 - deeply contrasting with the current architecture of control systems
 - difficult to integrate new vision with existing legacy systems
- Questionnaire and workshops: more conservative view
 - emphasis on risk assessment
 - diagnostics
 - control update methodologies (design, testing)



Thank you

GRID web site:

http://grid.jrc.it