Development of a Verified Erlang Program for Resource Locking

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Abstract. In this paper we describe a tool to verify Erlang programs and show, by means of an industrial case study, how this tool is used. The tool includes a number of components, including a translation component, a state space generation component and a model checking component.

To verify properties of the code, the tool first translates the Erlang code into a process algebraic specification. The outcome of the translation is made more efficient by using the fact that software written in Erlang builds upon software design patterns such as client–server behaviours. A labelled transition system is constructed from the specification by use of the μCRL toolset. The resulting labelled transition system is model checked against a set of properties formulated in the μ-calculus using the CAESAR/ALDÉBARAN toolset.

As a case-study we focus on a simplified resource manager modelled on a real implementation in the control software of the AXD 301 ATM switch. Some of the key properties we verified for the program are mutual exclusion and non-starvation. Since the toolset supports only the regular alternation free μ-calculus some ingenuity is needed for checking the liveness property ‘non-starvation’. The case-study has been refined step-by-step to provide more functionality; each step motivated by a corresponding formal verification using model checking.

The telecommunication company Ericsson is using the functional programming language Erlang [1] for the development of concurrent/distributed software for telecommunications equipment. One of the larger examples of such a system is the AXD 301 high capacity ATM switch [7], used to implement, for example, the backbone network in the UK. The software of this switch consists of about half a million lines of Erlang code.

This code is written in a development process that is rather similar to the Extreme Programming approach [27]: designers write and test it themselves and in small iterations, features are added to the code until a final release stage is reached.

In Ericsson the software for large projects like the AXD 301 switch is written according to rather strict design principles. For the AXD software, a number of software components are used which have been specified for use in a number of Ericsson projects. These components can be seen as higher-order functions for which certain functions have to be given to determine the specific functionality of the component. About eighty percent of the software implements code for this specific functionality of one of these components, the majority of this for the generic server component. The generic server is a component that implements a process with a simple state parameter and mechanism to handle messages in a fifo message queue.

The development process and the use of these library components both ensure that the code is tested many times before the final implementation. For example, during development the software is often written during day-time and tested overnight. The test cases are written by the designers in parallel with the code and a test server automatically runs these test cases.

However, despite this extensive testing, for critical devices such as telecommunications switches it is clearly preferable to have even higher levels of assurance that the code is correct. Our aim, therefore, is to build a

Key words: Formal Methods, Software Verification, Model Checking, Functional Programming, Erlang

1 Introduction

In this paper we describe an approach to the verification of Erlang code which involves model checking an abstraction of the code by translating it into a process algebra.
formal verification tool that fits into this development process.

The tool supports (overnight) verification of properties, the purpose of which is to check aspects similar to the testing process. This paper describes the tool that we developed and the use of the tool is illustrated by a case study that is taken from the AXD 301. The tool, and approach, is based on model checking a process algebraic representation of the Erlang code, and therefore involves issues such as abstraction of code to specification, state space generation and model checking. The advantage of our approach and tool over testing should be clear: it covers a larger portion of the state space of the system, indeed, when the state space is finite the whole state space can be verified.

The case study we describe in this paper is a distributed resource manager, which was re-designed in the same way as real production code would be re-designed. In small iterations the complexity of software was increased and properties were checked against these iterations in turn. Clearly our re-design is based on the same Ericsson design principles as the AXD 301 switch. Following these design principles and using real software components makes the verification approach more realistic and easier; the message buffers of arbitrary Erlang processes are more complicated than the constrained message buffer in a generic server. Thus, by using the semantics of the generic server, we obtain smaller state spaces.

Another requirement of our verification tool is that it should be accessible to Erlang programmers, without forcing them to learn a specification language. Clearly, they will receive help when formulating the properties they want to prove, but in fact these need not change much during the iterations in the development. A special team provides proof-scripts in which the properties are embedded and these can be run against the Erlang code. The feedback of these scripts is in terms of traces in Erlang syntax, so that programmers can understand the counter-examples that the model checker has produced.

In one sense this work is not new: using model checking for the formal verification of software is by now a well known field of research, it is in the details that we offer some novelty. There are essentially two approaches to the overall problem, either one uses a specification language in combination with a model checker to obtain a correct specification that is used to write an implementation in a programming language, or one takes the program code as a starting point and abstracts that into a model, which can be checked by a model checker. Either way, the implementation is not proved correct by these approaches, but when an error is encountered, this may indicate an error in the implementation. As such, the use of model checking can be seen as a very accurate testing method.

For the first approach, one of the most successful of the many examples is the combination of the specification language Promela and model checker SPIN [19]. The attractive merit of Promela is that this language is so close to the implementation language C, that it becomes rather easy to derive the implementation from the specification in a direct, fault free way. In case one uses UML as specification language and Java or C as implementation language, one might need more effort (apart from the fact that model checking UML specifications is still an unsettled topic).

The work we describe here is part of the second approach, other examples of which include PathFinder [18] and Bandera [10] which consider the problem of verifying code written in Java. Our work has similar concerns and follows a similar approach except that we use the knowledge of the occurring design patterns used in the Erlang code to obtain smaller state spaces. We follow a similar approach to the translation of Java into Promela, checked by SPIN [18]; however, we translate Erlang into μCRL [17] and model check by using CASAR/ALEBARAN [16].

An earlier attempt for model checking Erlang code by Huch [20] differs in many ways from our approach. In contrast to Huch's approach we consider data aspects which are crucial for the properties we wish to check in the Erlang code. In particular, Huch abstracts case statements by non-deterministic choices, this loses all reference to the data, whereas our model checking takes the data values into account.

This allows us to check for mutual exclusion and the absence of deadlock for the resource manager that will be the leading example of this paper. If one abstracts from the data in this program in such a way that case statements are translated into non-deterministic choices, then mutual exclusion is no longer guaranteed and can hence not be shown.

The paper is organised as follows: we start with a brief explanation of the AXD 301 switch in Sect. 2. Thereafter we explain the software components we focused on, viz. the generic server and supervisors in Sect. 3. The actual Erlang code, given in Sect. 4, is built using those components and along with the code we describe the implemented algorithm.

The main part of our tool, the translation of Erlang code into a process algebra model is presented in Sect. 5. This model is used to generate the labelled transition system in which the labels correspond to communication events between Erlang processes. We used additional external tools to generate the state space, reduce the state space with respect to bisimulation relations and to model check several properties.

In Sect. 6 we focus on the mutual exclusion and non-starvation property which have been verified for the code using model checking in combination with bisimulation reduction. In Sect. 7 we show how we use scripts to automate the actual verification in the development process. We conclude with some remarks on performance and feasibility, and a comparison to other approaches in Sect. 8.
2 Ericsson’s AXD 301 switch

Ericsson’s AXD 301 is a high capacity ATM switch, scalable from 10 to 160 GBit/s/sec [7]. The switch is used, for example, in the core network to connect city telephone exchanges with each other.

From a hardware point of view, the switch consists of a switch core, which is connected on one side to several device processors (that in their turn are connected to devices), and on the other side to an even number of control processors (workstations). The actual number of these control processors depends on the configuration and demanded capacity and ranges from 2 till 32 (see Fig. 1).

The workstations (control processors) operate in pairs for reasons of fault tolerance; one workstation is assigned to be the call control (cc) node and the other the operation and maintenance (o&m) node. Basically, the cc control deals with establishing connections, and operation and maintenance deals with configuration management, billing and such. Both the cc and o&m software consists of several applications, which implement many concurrently operating processes.

Every workstation runs one Erlang node, i.e., a program to execute Erlang byte code implementing several thousands of concurrent Erlang processes. The critical data of these processes is replicated and present on at least two nodes in the system. In case a workstation breaks down, a new Erlang node is started on the workstation it is paired with and depending on the functionality of the broken node, either the cc or the o&m applications are started.

A distributed resource locker is used when the broken workstation is restarted (or replaced) and available again for operation. A new Erlang node is started at the workstation, and the pairing workstation can leave one of its tasks to the restarted workstation. Typically o&m will be moved, since that is easiest to move. Although easiest, this is not without consequences. Every o&m application may access several critical resources and while doing so, it might be hazardous to move the application. For that reason, the designers of the switch have introduced a classical resource manager, here called a locker. Whenever any of the processes in any application needs to perform an operation during which that application cannot be moved, it will request a lock on the application. The lock can be shared by many processes, since they all indicate that the application is to remain at its node. The process that wants to move an application will also request a lock on that application, but this time an exclusive one. The purpose of this lock, therefore, is to enable guarantees to be given to processes about when they can safely move applications.

3 Erlang software components

In Ericsson’s large software projects the architecture of the software is described by means of software components, i.e., the implementation is specified by means of communicating servers, finite state machines, supervisors and such. In the control software for the AXD about eighty percent of the software is specified in terms of such components, the majority of it as processes that behave like servers.

3.1 Generic server component

A server is a process that waits for a message from another process, computes a certain response message and sends that back to the original process. Normally the server will have an internal state, which is initialised when starting the server and updated whenever a message has been received.

In Erlang one implements a server by creating a process that evaluates a (non-terminating) recursive function consisting of a receive statement in which every incoming message has a response as result.

```
serverloop(State) ->
    receive
        {call,Pid,Message} ->
            Pid ! compute_answer(Message,State),
            serverloop(compute_new_state(Message,State))
    end.
```

Erlang has an asynchronous communication mechanism where any process can send (using the ! operator) a message to any other process of which it happens to know the process identifier (the variable Pid in the example above). Sending is always possible and non-blocking; the message arrives in the unbounded mailbox of the specified process. The latter process can inspect its mailbox by the receive statement. A sequence of patterns can be specified to read specific messages from the mailbox. In the example above the first message in the mailbox
which has the form of a tuple is read, where the first argument of the tuple should be the atom call, the variable Pid is then bound to the second argument of this tuple, and Message is bound to its last argument.

Of course, this simple server concept gets decorated with a lot of features in a real implementation. There is a mechanism to delay the response to a message, and some messages simply never expect a reply. Certain special messages for stopping the server, logging events, changing code in a running system and so on, are added as patterns in the receive loop. Debugging information is provided, used during development and testing. All together this makes a server a rather large piece of software and since all these servers have the same structure, there are considerable advantages in providing a generic server implementation. This generic server has all features of the server, apart from the specific computation of reply message and new state. Put simply, by providing the above functions compute_answer and compute_new_state a fully functional server is specified with all necessary features for production code.

Reality is a bit more complicated, but not much: when starting a server one provides the name of a module in which the functions for initialisation and call handling are specified. One could see this as the generic server being a higher-order function which takes these specific functions, called callback functions, as arguments. The interface of these functions is determined by the generic server implementation. The initialisation function returns the initial state. A function handle_call is called with an incoming message, the client process identifier, and state of the server. It returns a tuple either of the form \{reply, Message, State\}, where the server takes care that this message is replied to the client and that the state is updated, or \{noreply, State\} where only a state update takes place. The locker algorithm that we present in this paper is implemented as a callback module of the generic server, thus the locker module implements the above mentioned functions for initialisation and call handling.

Client processes use a uniform way of communicating with the server, enforced by embedding the communication in a gen_server:call function call. This call causes the client to suspend as long as the server has not replied to the message. The specific function call adds a unique tag to the message to ensure that clients stay suspended even if other processes send messages to their mailbox.

### 3.2 Supervisor component

The assumption made when implementing the switch software is that any Erlang process may unexpectedly die, either because of a hardware failure, or a software error in the code evaluated in the process. The runtime system provides a mechanism to notify selected processes of the fact that a certain other process has vanished; this is realized by a special message that arrives in the mailbox of processes that are specified to monitor the vanished process.

On top of the Erlang primitives to ensure that processes are aware of the existence of other processes, a supervisor process is implemented. This process evaluates a function that creates processes which it will monitor, which we refer to as its children. After creating these processes, it enters a receive loop and waits for a process to die. If that happens, it might either restart the child or use another predefined strategy to recover from the problem.

### 4 The resource locker algorithm

The above sections have described the AXD 301 locker and the Erlang software components. We were interested in using this as a case-study to validate our approach to verification of Erlang code. However, the actual implementation is overly complex for this purpose and therefore we re-implemented a small portion of the code making appropriate simplifications where necessary.

Several prototypes have been developed and verified. In these prototypes the resource locking process is implemented as a server process (called ‘the locker’ in this paper). An arbitrary number of client processes can request and release resources by communicating with this server process.

In the first prototype, the locker provides access to one resource for an arbitrary number of clients. A second prototype [2] includes an arbitrary number of resources with exclusive access to them, i.e., two clients cannot get access to the same resource at the same time. In this section we show code fragments of the third prototype [3], which supports exclusive and shared access to the resources. Some remarks about the first and second prototypes are made where they might be of interest.

All the processes in the AXD 301 software are children in a big tree of supervisor processes. Thus, the locker and the clients of the locker also exist somewhere in this tree. In our case-study we implemented a small supervision tree for only the locker and a number of clients (Fig. 2).

The root of the tree has two children: the locker and another supervisor, which has as children all the client processes. As in the real software, the whole locker application is started by evaluating one expression, which starts building the supervision tree and makes all processes run.

It is important to realize that we use this supervision tree to start the locker in different configurations. As an argument of the start function for the supervisor we provide the set of resources that the specific clients want to access.

The expression

```erlang
locker_sup:start([[a],shared],[[a,b],exclusive])
```
Fig. 2. Supervision tree for locker and clients

, for example, would start a supervision tree with a locker and two clients, one client repeatedly requesting shared access to resource a, the other repeatedly requesting exclusive access to the resources a and b.

The locker is implemented as a callback module for the generic server. In the following subsections we present parts of the actual implementation of the client and locker and explain the underlying algorithm.

We present a significant part of the actual Erlang code in order to stress that we verify Erlang code and to illustrate the complexity of the kind of code we can deal with. The full case-study contains about 250 lines of code in which many advanced features of Erlang are used\(^1\).

### 4.1 Implementing the client

The client process is implemented in a simple module, we can do this since we have abstracted away from all evaluations in clients that do not directly relate to requesting, obtaining and releasing the resources. The generic server call mechanism is used to communicate with the locker. It is a synchronous communication implemented by means of Erlang’s asynchronous primitives.

\[-module(client).
\]

\[-start(Locker, Resources, Type) ->
\]

\{ok, spawn_link(client, loop, [Locker, Resources, Type])\}.

\[-loop(Locker, Resources, Type) ->
\]

\{gen_server:call(Locker, {request, Resources, Type}),
\{gen_server:call(Locker, release),
\{loop(Locker, Resources, Type)\}\}.

Between the two synchronous calls for request and release is the so called critical section. In the real implementation some critical code is placed in this critical section, but we have (manually) abstracted away from that. The variable Type represents the type of access a client is requesting on the list of resources. This can be either shared or exclusive and Resources is bound to a list of resources that the client wants access to.

### 4.2 Implementing the locker

The code of the locker algorithm is given as a generic server callback module. The state of this server contains a record of type lock for every resource that the locker controls.

\[-module(locker).
\]

\[-behaviour(gen_server).
\]

\[-record(lock, {resource, exclusive, shared, pending}).
\]

The lock record has four fields: resource for putting the identifier of the resource, exclusive containing the process that is having exclusive access to the resource (or none otherwise), shared containing a list of all processes that are having shared access to the resource, and pending containing a list of pending processes, either waiting for shared or for exclusive access.

The supervisor process constructs a list of all resources involved from the starting configuration and passes it to the initialisation of the locker. The locker initialisation function then initialises a lock record for every resource in that list. The state of the server is built by taking this list and constructing a tuple together with the lists for all exclusive requests and all shared requests that have not been handled so far.

\[-init(Resources) ->
\]

\{ok, \{map(fun(Name) ->
\[
\#
lock(resource = Name,
exclusive = none,
shared = [],
pending = [])
\end, Resources)\}.\}

The latter two (initially empty) lists in the state of the server are used by the algorithm to optimize the computations performed when deciding which pending client is the next one that gets access. The first client in the pending list of the lock record is not necessarily granted permission to obtain the resource. It may be the case that the same client also waits for another resource, for which another client has higher priority. The priority could be reconstructed by building a graph of dependencies between the clients, but it is much easier to store the order in which the requests arrive.

The server process continuously accesses its message queue and whenever a call to the server has been made, the corresponding message will eventually arrive at the head of the queue. Then, the function handle_call in the locker module is called. For a request message, this function first checks whether all requested resources are available. If so, it claims the resources by updating the

\(^1\) The code is available at \texttt{http://www.cs.kent.ac.uk/~cb47/}.
lock records. The client receives an acknowledgement
and the state of the server is updated accordingly. If the
resources are not available, the lock records are updated
by putting the client in the pending lists of the requested
resources. The priority lists are changed, resulting in a
new state for the server. No message is sent to the client,
which causes the client to be suspended.

\[
\text{handle_call}(\{\text{request}, \text{Resources}, \text{Type}\}, \text{Client},\)
\]
\[
\text{case check_availables(\text{Resources}, \text{Type}, \text{Locks}) of true ->}
\]
\[
\text{NewLocks = map(fun(Lock) ->}
\text{claim_lock(Lock, Resources, Type, Client),}
\text{end, Locks),}
\text{\{reply, ok, \{NewLocks, Excls, Shared\}\}; false ->}
\text{NewLocks = map(fun(Lock) ->}
\text{add_pending(Lock, Resources, Type, Client),}
\text{end, Locks),}
\text{case Type of exclusive ->}
\text{\{noreply, \{NewLocks, Excls++[Client], shared\}\};}
\text{shared ->}
\text{\{noreply, \{NewLocks, Excls, Shared++[Client]\}\}.}
\text{end;}
\]

A client can release all its obtained resources by a sim-ple release message, since the identity of the client is
sufficient to find out which resources it requested. After
removing the client from the fields in the lock record, it
is checked whether pending processes now have the
possibility to access the requested resources. This hap-
pen with higher priority for the clients that request ex-
cluasive access, than for the clients that request shared
access. The algorithm prescribes that clients that re-
qust shared access to a resource but are waiting for
access, should be by-passed by a client that requests ex-
cluasive access.

\[
\text{handle_call}(\text{release}, \text{Client}, \{\text{Locks}, \text{Exclusives}, \text{Shared}\}) =
\]
\[
\text{Locks1 = map(fun(Lock) ->}
\text{release_lock(Lock, Client),}
\text{end, Locks),}
\text{\{Locks2, NewExclusives\} =}
\text{send_reply(exclusive, Locks1, Exclusives, []),}
\text{\{Locks3, NewShared\} =}
\text{send_reply(shared, Locks2, Shared, []),}
\text{\{reply, done, \{Locks3, NewExclusives, NewShared\}\}.}
\]

The function send_reply checks whether a list of pend-
ing clients (either requesting exclusive or shared access)
can be granted access. If so, the client receives the ack-
nowledgement that it was waiting for, and the state of
the server is updated.

send_reply(Type, Locks, []) ->
\{Locks, NewPendings\};
send_reply(Type, Locks, [Pending | Pendings], NewPendings) ->
\text{case all_obtainable(Locks, Type, Pending) of}
\text{true ->}
\text{gen_server:reply(Pending, ok),}
\text{send_reply(Type,}
\text{map(fun(Lock) ->}
\text{promote_pending(Lock, Type, Pending, Lock, Pendings, NewPendings),
\text{end, Locks), Pendings, NewPendings);}
\text{false ->}
\text{send_reply(Type, Locks, Pendings, NewPendings++[Pending]).}
\]

The above mentioned Erlang functions in the locker combine message passing and computation. The rest of the function is purely computational and rather straightforward to implement. Therefore, here we only illustrate the more interesting aspects.

The function check_availables is used to determine whether a new requesting client can immediately be served. A resource is available for exclusive access if no client holds the resource and no other client is waiting for exclusive access to it. Note that it is not sufficient to only check whether no client accesses the resource at the time, since this could cause starvation. To illustrate this, imagine two resources and three clients, such that client 1 requests resource A, client 2 requests resource B, and thereafter client 3 requests both resources. Client 1 releases and requests resource A again, client 2 releases and requests B again. If this repeatedly continues, client 3 will wait for ever to get access, i.e., client 3 will starve.

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<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pending</td>
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client 1 requests and gets access to A
client 2 requests and gets access to B

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<tr>
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<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>pending</td>
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client 3 requests access to A and B and is put in the pending list

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client 1 releases

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client 1 requests and gets access to A again
client 2 requests and gets access to B again

This scenario indicates that in general one has to pay a price for optimal resource usage: viz. a possible starvation. Therefore, the implementation checks whether a client is waiting for a certain resource. Thus, in our example, client 1 and 2 are both appended to the list of
pending processes (waiting for client 3). Similar to the exclusive case, for shared access the resource is available if no process holds the resource exclusively, neither is a client waiting for access to it. Therefore, the same conclusion holds, i.e., potential starvation is a consequence of optimal resource usage.

The function `add_pending` simply inserts the client in the pending lists of the resources it is requesting. An optimisation is applied when inserting clients in the pending list: clients requesting exclusive access are mentioned before the ones requesting shared access. This allows a quick check to see if there is a client exclusively waiting for a resource, such a client should then be at the head of the pending list.

The difference between the functions `check_available` and `all_obtainable` is that in the latter the clients have already been added to the pending lists of the requested resources and therefore it should be checked that they are at the head of these lists instead of checking that these lists are empty. Moreover, there might be several clients able to get access to their resources after only one release, e.g., resources that were taken exclusively can be shared by several clients and a client that occupied several resources can free those resources for a number of different clients.

5 Translating Erlang into a process algebra

In order to check that certain properties hold for all possible runs of a program, we automatically translate the Erlang modules into a process algebraic specification. This approach allows us to use tools developed for analysing process algebras rather than implementing tools that work directly on Erlang code ourselves. This has a number of benefits, for example, the use of a process algebra allows us to distinguish in a formal way communication actions and computation. It also means that complex issues such as efficient state space generation are dealt with by reusing existing tools which have been developed and refined over a number of years.

The process algebra we used to translate Erlang to is μCRL [17]. This process algebra is particularly suited to our requirements because we can express both communication and data in it.

Several tools have been developed to support verification of μCRL specifications [11,28]. Our approach to verification uses a model checker from the CÆSAR/Aldébaran toolset [16]. In order to input the μCRL specifications into the model checker, we need to convert the specification to an appropriate input format using the state space generation tool of the μCRL toolset. We have also experimented with static analysis tools to obtain specifications that resulted in smaller state spaces after generation, for example, the `confcheck` [26] tool from the μCRL toolset which analyzes particular (confluent) internal actions in order to eliminate them. However, this had not as big an impact as we had hoped for. We have not yet investigated how we can best fine-tune the translation to optimally use these tools.

The translation from Erlang to μCRL is performed in two steps. First we apply a source-to-source transformation on the level of Erlang, resulting in Erlang code that exhibits the same execution behaviour, to an observer, as does the original code, but is optimised for verification. Second we translate the collection of Erlang modules into a μCRL specification. The advantage of having an intermediate Erlang format is that programmers can easily understand the more involved code transformations and therefore are better able to understand the smaller translation step to μCRL notation and by translating some syntactic sugar to more primitive operators, the step to μCRL is easier to implement. Moreover, the intermediate code can be input for other verification tools for Erlang (e.g., [4]).

5.1 Erlang to Erlang transformation

The source-to-source transformation of the Erlang modules contains many steps and we mention only the more relevant ones, skipping trivial steps like removing the debug statements in the code.

Erlang supports higher-order functions, but μCRL does not. Luckily, most of the Erlang code in the switch only uses a few predefined higher order functions, like `map`, `foldl`, `foldr`, etc. Thus, we wrote a source-to-source translator to replace function call occurrences like

```
map(fun(X) -> f(X, Y1, ..., Yn) end, Xs)
```

by a call to a new Erlang function `map_f(Xs, Y1, ..., Yn)` which is defined and added to the code as

```
map_f([], Y1, ..., Yn) ->
  [];
map_f([X|Xs], Y1, ..., Yn) ->
  [f(X, Y1, ..., Yn) | map_f(Xs, Y1, ..., Yn)] .
```

By using this transformation we can remove all calls to the `map` function from the Erlang code. Other higher-order functions are dealt with in a similar manner.

Because of a possible infinite state space, we avoid dynamic process creation in μCRL. Therefore, we generate the μCRL specification for a certain configuration in which the processes are fixed from the beginning. From the Erlang code in which the processes are generated dynamically, we obtain our specification by evaluating the supervision tree structure for the given configuration parameters.

In Sect. 4 we explained how to start the locker process, e.g., by evaluating `locker_sup:start([{a},shared],{a,b}).` Evaluating the same expression in our tool instead of in the Erlang runtime system, results in one initial Erlang process in which all leaves in the supervision tree are started sequentially. This special process is later translated in the initialisation clause of the μCRL specification.
With some minor tricks the pure functional part of the Erlang code is rather easily translated into a term rewriting system on data, as necessary in a $\mu$CRL model. Communication in Erlang is translated into communicating actions in $\mu$CRL as described in the next section.

5.2 Erlang to $\mu$CRL transformation

Given the Erlang modules that are transformed as described above, the next step is to automatically generate a $\mu$CRL specification. Erlang is dynamically typed whereas $\mu$CRL is strongly typed. Since we try to keep the specification in $\mu$CRL as close to the Erlang code as possible we construct in $\mu$CRL a data type $\textit{ErlangTerm}$ in which all Erlang data types are embedded. All side-effect free functions are added as a term rewriting system over this $\textit{ErlangTerm}$ data type. A standard transformation is used to translate Erlang statements into the term rewriting formalism. In addition, we have to define an equivalence relation on data types, which is rather involved. For instance, with only 14 different atoms and 7 data constructors, 440 equations are reserved for comparing data types, roughly two thirds of the whole specification.

With respect to the non-computation part, we benefit from the fact that the Erlang to Erlang transformation was generated for a specific configuration and contains all information on which processes are started. This allows us to define the initial configuration in the $\mu$CRL specification.

Manipulation of data in this process algebra is performed purely functional, i.e., there are functions defined on the data that result in manipulated data, but no communication can be incorporated in this computation part. Processes describe the communication pattern and the computations on the data; different from Erlang, these two parts are clearly separated, in the sense that no communication takes place in a computation. As a consequence, some code needs to be rewritten to be translated. To clarify the latter, in Erlang one can write a call to the function $\textit{send_reply}$ as on page 6, which results in a tuple. Part of that tuple is used in the next call to $\textit{send_reply}$. Here we have to lift the communication to the same level of the $\textit{handle_call}$ function that is calling $\textit{send_reply}$, i.e., not nested inside a computation. From an Erlang point of view, it would look like adding extra communication, where the last thing the $\textit{send_reply}$ function does is sending a value to the process that has called this function\(^2\).

\(send\_reply(\text{exclusive}, \text{Locks1}, \text{Exclusives}, [\text{],})\),
\begin{verbatim}
receive
  \{\text{Locks2}, \text{NewExclusives}\} ->
  send_reply(\text{shared}, \text{Locks2}, \text{Shared}, [\text{],})
receive
  \{\text{Locks3}, \text{NewShared}\} ->
  \{\text{reply, done, \{\text{Locks3}, \text{NewExclusives}, \text{NewShared}\}}\}
end
\end{verbatim}

In our tool this translation of function with nested communication is directly performed from Erlang to $\mu$CRL, without the above intermediate Erlang code, which is only given to explain the translation. One could say that we implemented the well known notion of a call-stack by means of communication.

All functions that contain communication coincide with the notion of a process in $\mu$CRL. Certain restrictions with respect to these $\mu$CRL processes have to be taken into account; there is no pattern matching on data parameters of a process. Thus several clauses of the same Erlang function have to be translated in one $\mu$CRL process by explicitly encoding of pattern matching, by using the $\mu$CRL if-then-else construct (denoted by ‘\textit{then | if | > else}’) and calls to newly introduced processes.

The synchronous calls of the generic server can be translated directly in a synchronising pair of actions in $\mu$CRL. This results in comfortably small state spaces, much smaller than when we implement a buffer for a server and use both synchronisation between another process and the buffer of the server and synchronisation between buffer and server. The latter is, however, necessary if we use the more extended functionality of the generic server, where we also have an asynchronous way of calling the server. Moreover, the synchronous calls of the generic server are implemented in Erlang by means of asynchronous primitives. Therefore we implement for every generic server process a buffer process in $\mu$CRL for both synchronous and the asynchronous communication. We use the knowledge about the generic server component to implement this buffer: the generic server uses a \textit{fifo} buffer structure. This is in contrast with an arbitrary Erlang process, where a message can be read from the buffer in any order. For illustration purpose, a simplified version of this buffer in $\mu$CRL is given below.

\begin{verbatim}
\textbf{comm}
\textbf{gen_server_call | gscall = buffercall}
\textbf{gscall | handle_call = call}
\textbf{gen_server_reply | gen_server_replied = reply}
\end{verbatim}
\begin{verbatim}
\textbf{proc}
\textbf{Server_Buffer}(Self: ErlangTerm, Messages: GSBuffer) =
\{\textit{bufferfull}(Self),
  \textit{gscall}(Self, call_term(Messages), call_pid(Messages),
  Server_Buffer(Self, rmhead(Messages))), \}
\textbf{<| maxbuffer(Messages) | >}
\end{verbatim}

\(^2\) Assume a special tag for the Erlang receive to make sure the right message is read from the queue.
(sum(Msg: ErlangTerm,  
  sum(From: ErlangTerm,  
    gcall(Self, Msg, From).  
    Server_Buffer(Self, addcall(Msg, From, Messages))) +  
  (gshcall(Self, call_term(Messages), call_pid(Messages)).  
    Server_Buffer(Self, rmhead(Messages))))

The buffer associated with each process is parameterised by its size and by default unbounded; during the verification process the buffer is bound to a certain size to allow the verifier to experiment with the size. The latter is important, since some errors cause a buffer overflow, which induces a non-terminating generation of the state space. However, if the message queue is bound to a low enough value, the buffer overflow is visible as an action in the state space.

The different clauses of the server’s handle_call function are combined in one µCRL loop, using the state mentioned in the arguments of handle_call as state of the loop. The unique process identifiers used in Erlang are integrated as an argument (Self) of all process calls and instantiated by the first call in the initial part.

For example, the Erlang code presented in Sect. 4.2 for the handling of a request message by the locker process is translated to µCRL as shown below:\(^3\)

The process locker_serverloop synchronises with the buffer in the handle_call action which has as arguments the identifier of the process, the message sent by the client process and the process identifier of the client. Then the availability of the resources is checked in the function locker_check_available(Resouces,Type,locks)\(^4\). Note that the pattern matching in Erlang is translated by means of selection functions that extract the first, second, etc. element of a tuple. If the resources are available, the client receives an ok, and the locker_serverloop is called with an update of the state that reflects that the resources are now being used by the client (function locker_map_claim_lock).

Otherwise, the locker_serverloop is called with a different update of the state to reflect that the client is waiting for the resources to be released. This is done slightly differently for shared access than for exclusive access as explained in Sect. 4.2. Note that no message is sent to the client in this case.

locker_serverloop(Self: ErlangTerm, State: ErlangTerm)  
sum(Client: ErlangTerm,  
  sum(Resources: ErlangTerm,  
    sum(Type: ErlangTerm,  
      handle_call(Self,  
        tuple(request, tuple(Resources, tuplenil(Type), Client))).  
      (gen_server_reply(Client, ok, Self).  
        locker_serverloop(Self,  
          tuple(locker_map_claim_lock(first(State),  
            Resources, Client, Type),  
            tuple(second(State), tuplenil(third(State)))))))  
  eq(equall(locker_check_available(Resouces,  
    Type, first(State)), true), true) |>

The delta mentioned in the specification is a special symbol for deadlock. These possible deadlocks are introduced by the automatic translation due to the difference in Erlang and µCRL. If the Erlang program is type safe, i.e., no runtime type error occurs, then these delta’s will never cause a deadlock in the µCRL process. However, a runtime type error, and hence a crash of the Erlang process, would result in a deadlock of the µCRL process.

Some matching constructs are part of a pure computation part in Erlang. In a translation of such a match, we cannot simply include a delta. In those cases, we add before the computation an assertion that evaluates to assertion(true) or assertion(false). If the latter of them appears in the state space, this corresponds to a situation in which the Erlang program would have crashed on an impossible pattern matching and we obtain for free a path from the initial state to the location where this happens. We also provided the possibility to add user defined actions. By annotating the code with dummy function calls, we may add extra actions to the model to allow us to explicitly visualize a certain event.

In this way, the Erlang modules are translated into a µCRL specification. By using the state space generation tool for µCRL, we obtain the full state space, in the form of a labelled transition system (LTS), for the possible runs of the Erlang program. The labels in this state space are syntactically equal to function calls in Erlang that accomplish communication, e.g., gen_server:call. This makes debugging the Erlang program easy when a sequence in the state space is presented as counter-example to a certain property. For that reason, the syntactically slightly different data structures in µCRL are translated back to Erlang data structures in the LTS.

Fig. 3 displays an LTS for the scenario mentioned in Sect. 4, where a supervision tree was started with a locker and two clients, one client repeatedly requesting shared access to resource A, the other repeatedly requesting exclusive access to the resources A and B. In order to be able to show
it here, all the communication with the buffer has been hidden and the LTS reduced by using suitable tools from the 
CÆSAR/Aldébaran toolset.

Once we have obtained the state space, the CÆSAR/Aldébaran toolset is used for verifying properties, as is described in the 
next section.

6 Checking properties with a model checker

In order to verify properties we have used the CÆSAR/Aldébaran toolset which provides a number of tools including an 
interactive graphical simulator, a tool for visualization of labelled transition systems (LTSs), several tools for computing 
bisimulations (minimizations and comparisons), and a model checker. Many aspects of the toolset were found useful for 
exploring the behaviour of the algorithm, but here we concentrate on the model checker.

Model checking[9] is a formal verification technique which performs automatic checking of properties against finite state 
specifications. The major advantages of model checking are that it is an automatic technique, and that when the model 
of the system fails to satisfy a desired property, the model checker always produces a counter example. These faulty 
traces provide a priceless insight to understanding the real reason for the failure as well as important clues for fixing the 
problem.

The properties one wishes to check are formalized in an appropriate logic, and the specification is written, here, as an 
LTS. As mentioned previously, our specifications in µCRL are translated into LTSs which are used as the model against 
which properties are checked.

The logic used to formalize properties is the regular alternation free µ-calculus which is a fragment of the modal µ-
calculus [22,13], a first-order logic with modalities and least and greatest fixed point operators. Logics like CTL or ACTL 
allow a direct encoding in the alternation free µ-calculus.

Several safety and liveness properties have successfully been verified on the three prototypes of the locker. Here we 
explain in detail how mutual exclusion (Sect. 6.1) and non-starvation (Sect. 6.2) are proved. The liveness property, non-
starvation, is the more difficult of the two.

The use of regular alternation free µ-calculus to express these properties allowed a sufficiently high level of abstraction 
that meant we could reuse the expression of the properties in each of the different prototypes with minimal changes. As 
previously, we illustrate the process for the third prototype.

6.1 Mutual Exclusion

To prove mutual exclusion we formulate a property expressing that when a client gets exclusive access to a resource, 
then no other client can access it before this client releases the resource. This property is crucial in the AXD 301 locker 
since otherwise when the process that wants to move an application has exclusive access to it, another process may get 
access to the application and perform critical operations at the same time.

In order to simplify checking this we add two actions, use and free, to the Erlang code which are automatically 
translated into the µCRL specification. As soon as a client process enters its critical section, the use action is applied 
with the list of resources the client is requesting as an argument.

Before the client sends a release message to the locker process, it performs a free action. In the logic we specify the 
action in plain text or with regular expressions. However, the formalism does not permit binding a regular expression 
in one action and using it in another. Therefore, we have to specify mutual exclusion for every resource in our system. We 
defined a macro to help us improve readability:

\[
\text{BETWEEN}(a_1, a_2, a_3) = [-\cdot a_1 \cdot (\neg a_2)^* \cdot a_3]\false
\]

stating that 'on all possible paths, after an \(a_1\) action, any \(a_3\) action must be preceded by an \(a_2\) action'.

The mutual exclusion property depends on the number of resources. For a system with two resources, A and B, the 
mutual exclusion property for the third prototype is formalized by

\[
\text{MUTEX}(A, B) = \\
\text{BETWEEN}'(\text{use}(\cdot A^*, \text{exclusive}), \text{free}(\cdot A^*), \text{use}(\cdot A^*, \cdot B^*))' \wedge \\
\text{BETWEEN}'(\text{use}(\cdot B^*, \text{exclusive}), \text{free}(\cdot B^*), \text{use}(\cdot B^*, \cdot A^*))'
\]

Informally the property states that when a client obtains exclusive access to resource A no other client can access it 
until the first client frees the resource, and the same for resource B. Note that the CÆSAR/Aldébaran toolset allows us to use regular expressions over strings together with standard µ-calculus formulas.

The mutual exclusion property has been successfully checked for various configurations up to three resources and five clients 
requesting exclusive or shared access to the resources.

For example, a scenario with five clients requesting exclusive access to three resources where client 1 requests A, 
client 2 requests B, client 3 requests A, B and C, client 4 requests A and B, and client 5 requests C, contains about 
30 thousand states. Building an LTS for this example takes

\[^4\text{The tools allow renaming of labels in the LTS, which could have been used as well.}\]

\[^5\text{This free action is non-synchronizing and therefore it can take the role of the release message, but also contains the resources that are released.}\]
roughly thirteen minutes, while checking the mutual exclusion property takes only nine seconds. A bigger state space of one million states needs one hour to be built and four minutes to be checked for mutual exclusion. Part of the reason that building the LTS takes much more time than checking a property is that we deal with data and that a lot of computation is done in between the visible actions (only visible actions correspond to states in the LTS).

As stated in the previous section, model checking is a powerful debugging tool. Imagine that the code of the locker contains the following error: the function `check available` is wrongly implemented such that when a client requests a resource there is no check that the resource is being used by another client. Now consider a scenario with two clients, client 1 and client 2, requesting the same resource $A$. Given the LTS for this scenario and the property $MUTEX(A)$, the model checker returns `false` and the counter example as shown in Fig. 4.

The counter example generated depicts an execution trace of client 1 requesting and obtaining resource $A$ and client 2 requesting and obtaining resource $A$, that is, both processes enter the critical section and, therefore, mutual exclusion is not preserved. The numbers that appear inside the circles correspond to the numbers of the states as they appear in the complete LTS. By keeping the Erlang code and our $\mu$CRL specification as close as possible, this trace helps us easily identify the run in the Erlang program.

Although we only use a small number of clients and resources, this already illustrates the substantive behaviour. In a fashion similar to that when we test software, we choose our configurations in such a way that we cover many unique situations, however, in contrast to testing, we explore all possible runs of a certain configuration. In our case-study there are at most 32 Erlang nodes and at most 16 lockers, which all have only a small number of resources (applications) to manage. We have checked the properties for scenarios with at most five clients in order to develop our methodology. Later we plan to scale up this approach once we have determined the optimal strategies.

6.2 Non-Starvation

Starvation is the situation where a client that has requested access to resources never receives permission from the locker to access them. Because exclusive access has priority over shared access, the algorithm contains potential starvation for clients requesting shared access to resources that are also exclusively requested. More precisely, the clients requesting exclusive access have priority over all clients that are waiting for shared access, therefore the ones requesting shared access can be withheld from their resources.

Within the use of the software in the AXD at most one client is requesting exclusive access to the resources (the take-over process). In that setting, the starvation of clients requesting shared access cannot occur, as we prove below. The reason is the synchronized communication for the release. As soon as the client requesting exclusive access sends a release to the locker, all waiting shared clients get access to the resources they requested (they share them). Only after this an acknowledgement is sent to the releasing client.

Here we look at more general cases where more than one client is requesting exclusive access to the resources (since this type of scenarios may occur in a more general setting).

Because of the fact that the algorithm contains a certain form of starvation, the property one wants to check for non-starvation has to be specified with care. The following cases have been verified: non-starvation of clients requesting exclusive access and non-starvation of clients requesting shared access in the presence of at most one exclusive request.

6.2.1 Non-starvation for exclusive access

Proving that there is no starvation for the clients requesting exclusive access to the resources turned out to be tricky. This is caused by the fact that there are traces in the LTS that do not correspond to a fair run of the Erlang program.

The Erlang run-time system guarantees that each process obtains a slot of time to execute its code. However, in the LTS there are traces where certain processes do not get any execution time, even though they are enabled along the path. To clarify this, let us consider a scenario with two resources and three clients.

Client 1 requests resource $A$ and obtains access to it, client 2 request resource $A$ and has to wait. Thereafter client 3 requests $B$, obtains access to it, releases the resource and requests it again. Fig. 5 shows a part of the LTS where there is a clear starvation situation for client 2, viz. infinitely often traversing the cycle that client 3 is responsible for ($4 \to 23 \to 10 \to 24 \to 4 \to \ldots$).

The above scenario, however, does not reflect the real execution of the program since the Erlang run-time system will eventually schedule client 1 to execute its code. Client 1 will sooner or later release resource $A$, which causes client 2 to get access to the resource. In the LTS, it is visible that client 2 has the possibility to access resource $A$, but the unfair cycle of client 3 hides the fact that this will happen. Note, though, that we cannot simply forget about every cycle. If the cycle would be shown with resource $A$ instead of $B$ mentioned, then this would indicate a real starvation.

One could think of a number of solutions to solve the problem of cycles in the LTS that do not correspond to fair infinite computations in the Erlang program. For example,
one could explicit model the Erlang run-time scheduler. However, modelling the scheduler is a rather complex solution that would increase the size of the LTS notably. Besides, we would be scheduling the actions in the \( \mu \text{CRL} \) code, not in the real Erlang code. Thus we would not be sure that starvation really occurs in the Erlang implementation.

Another possible solution is to encode the unrealistic cycles, i.e., the ones that the real scheduler would exclude, in the property so that they are ignored. In order to do that we need to characterize the unrealistic cycles. An unrealistic cycle corresponds to unfair execution of a number of clients that are independent of the client one wants to prove non-starvation for.

In our specific case a client depends on another client when the intersection of the sets of resources they request is non-empty. Given that one is interested in proving non-starvation of a certain client, then computing the clients that are independent of this client is done by taking the complement of the reflexive, transitive closure of this dependency relation. If we now consider all actions of independent clients to be internal actions (\( \tau \) actions in process algebra terminology), then non-starvation of the client \( C \) we are interested in, could be expressed by the guaranteed occurrence of \( \text{reply}(ok,C) \) in any path starting from \( \text{gen_server:call}(* \text{request}, C) \), modulo possible cycles with only \( \tau \) steps. This can be expressed by the following formula in the \( \mu \)-calculus, where we allow only finite cycles of actions that are neither \( \tau \), nor \( \text{reply}(ok,C) \) actions. Infinite sequences of only \( \tau \) actions are, however, permitted:

\[
\mu X.\langle \neg \tau \land \neg \text{reply}(ok,C) \rangle [X \land \langle \tau \rangle Y].
\]

The disadvantage with the above formula is that it has alternating fixed point operators and hence the model checker cannot verify this property.

The solution is to reduce the state space by use of observational equivalence \cite{B05} and a facility to do this is provided by the \textsc{caesar/aldébaran} toolset. By applying this reduction we replaced actions of independent processes by internal actions, we obtain a model in which pure \( \tau \) cycles no longer occur. Thus, we removed all unfair cycles.

Modulo observational equivalence, the formula to prove non-starvation becomes much simpler and, in particular, is alternation-free:

\[
\text{NONSTARVATION}(C) = \\
\langle \neg \tau \rangle \text{gen_server:call}(* \text{request}, C) \\
\mu X.\langle \neg \tau \land \neg \text{reply}(ok,C) \rangle [X]
\]

Verification of non-starvation for a configuration of clients and resources is now performed by consecutively selecting a process that requests exclusive access to a set of resources. We manually determine the set of processes that is independent of this process, and then hide the labels of the independent processes. The LTS obtained is reduced modulo observational bisimulation, and we can then verify the above given property on the reduced LTS.

In this way we successfully verified non-starvation of the clients requesting exclusive access to resources in several configurations. We also found a counter example, by checking this property for a process that requests shared access to resources in a configuration where two clients ask exclusive access to resource A and a third requests shared access to A.

In this case we see that the third client is starving. This is exactly as we expect, since clients demanding exclusive access have priority over clients asking for shared access.

6.2.2 Non-starvation for shared access

Even though clients that request shared access to a resource may potentially starve, as explained above, we can still prove non-starvation of all the clients in the system, provided that at most one client demands exclusive access.

In analogy to the procedure described above, we hide the actions of independent processes and verify \textit{NONSTARVATION}(\( C \)) for every client \( C \) in the configuration. As such, the verification is performed successfully.

7 Automation of verification

In the previous sections we described the automatic translation of Erlang to \( \mu \text{CRL} \) and we showed how the properties mutual exclusion and non-starvation are verified. In this section we explain how the verification of properties can be automated.

Automation is achieved by using the Script Verification Language (SVL) from the \textsc{caesar/aldébaran} toolset. SVL allows us to simplify and automate the verification by means of high-level operators on the LTSs, for instance, minimisation, label hiding, label renaming and model-checking operators, and several methods of verification. Moreover, Bourne shell commands can be invoked within an SVL description, thus, the tool to translate Erlang to \( \mu \text{CRL} \), \textit{etomert}, and the \( \mu \text{CRL} \) tools to build the LTS can be called within the script.

This script is called with the Erlang term that should start the application in a certain configuration. The supervision design contains all information for the Erlang loading system to automatically locate the necessary modules. Thus, this one Erlang term suffices for automatically generating a \( \mu \text{CRL} \) specification. The script contains further instructions to use the state space generation tool in order to build the LTS from the \( \mu \text{CRL} \) specification. The same script is used to verify the properties for this LTS with the model checking tool. The outcome of the model checker is either \textit{true} or \textit{false} and in the latter case a counter-example is saved. The script makes sure that this counter example is stored for later inspection. In this way, provided the simple scripts, our tool automatically verifies properties of real Erlang applications.

However, when verifying the non-starvation property we perform several manipulations of the LTS, reduce the LTS with respect to observational bisimulation and only then verify the property. This is expressible in a script, but at present our tool cannot generate such a script automatically (see Fig. 6).

We accept that a certain ingenuity is necessary to create both property and script, but given the fact that we want to use our tool in an iterative development process, we want to minimise the number of times that these properties have to be updated because of a small change in the configuration or application.

In the following two subsections, we show that verification is parametric with respect to a given configuration and with respect to the application with certain restrictions.
7.1 Independence of configuration

The properties given in Sect. 6 depend on the actual names of the resources.

For example, for the mutual exclusive property a BETWEEN clause is added for every resource available in the system. We solved this by using only one property, viz.

\[ \text{MUTEX} = \left\{ \text{\textbackslash use(exclusive)} \right\} \cdot \left\{ \text{\textbackslash free(exclusive)} \right\} \cdot \text{\textbackslash use(} . \text{)}\left\} \cdot \text{false} \]

and rename the appropriate actions in the state space. Thus, given that a resource is in the system, we rename the labels \text{\textbackslash use}(r, \text{exclusive}) to \text{\textbackslash use(exclusive)} etc. After this renaming, it suffices to check the above property in order to prove mutual exclusion for resource \( r \). This is repeated for all resources. The script that performs the renaming and checking is generated from the configuration. Of course, renaming and model checking several times is in general more expensive than only performing the model checking with a more complicated property. We could also automatically generate this more complicated property from the configuration, but would then need to describe the property as a kind of template with an unbounded number of these BETWEEN clauses. The motivation for our approach is that the properties should be easy to read and understand and that we want to stick to a standard logic. We trade understandability of the property for efficiency of the verification.

For verification of non-starvation we go one step further. Here the property depends on the process identifier of the client. We restrict to one property here as well, viz.

\[ \text{NONSTARVATION} = \left\{ \text{\textbackslash request}\right\} \mu X. \left( \left\{ \text{\textbackslash ok}\right\} \wedge \left\{ \text{\textbackslash ok}\right\}\wedge \right) \]

We have to build a graph of processes that depend on a common resource. From the configuration we obtain information on which resources a client needs. By storing the process identifier of the client together with the resources this client requests in the vertex of a graph and by adding an edge whenever two nodes have a resource in common, it is easy to obtain all processes that depend on a certain client, viz. all those that are in the same closely connected component. This is straightforward to implement, but realizing that this algorithm is what we need for verification of non-starvation is not part of the automation.

For every client we repeat the same steps in a script. We hide all processes (i.e., rename to \( r \)) that are not dependent on this process and rename all actions of depending processes to a constant other. In this way only the request, ok, and release messages of the process we want to verify non-starvation for remain as labels in the LTS. The above property can therefore be used for our verification purposes. In Fig. 6 such a script is presented for a configuration with three clients of which two are depending on each other, in particular, the client process with process identifier 0 requests exclusive access to resource A, the client process with process identifier 1 requests exclusive access to resource B, and the client process with process identifier 2 also requests exclusive access to resource B.

Since non-starvation has to be checked for all clients separately, there is not the same decrease in performance as for the mutual exclusion property. In the most optimal case one renaming per group of dependent processes could suffice. Again we motivate our choice by claiming that the property in combination with the script is easier to understand than the more involved properties that we would get if we consider a whole group at once.

7.2 Independence of development iteration

Using the technique of creating scripts as described above we obtain a situation in which the mechanical steps of performing a verification are independent of the configuration. This is useful when an application reached a certain point in its development and is verified for a number of configurations.

However, the application will be modified and features will be added. As long as those modifications do not influence the syntax of the messages that are communicated, the verification approach is not affected. Changes in the communication, though, normally required to investigate whether the properties and scripts have to be changed.

In our case-study, the syntax of the messages is only slightly modified through the iterations on the code. Lets consider the mutual exclusion property. In the first iteration of the locker algorithm, there is only one resource in the system, therefore, the property mutual exclusion in this case had been defined as:

\[ \text{MUTEX} = \left\{ \text{\textbackslash use}' . \left( \text{\textbackslash free}'\right) . \text{\textbackslash use}'\right\} \cdot \text{false} \]

The same property holds for the second iteration of the code where there are several resources but with only exclusive access to them. For every resource \( r \), the actions use(\( r \)) are renamed to use.
However, in the case of the third iteration where resources may also be shared by different clients, the above property is not sufficient. Here we only want to prove mutual exclusion for exclusive access, but we need to take into account that the resources may also be obtained for shared access. Thus, the property mutual exclusion is the one shown in the previous subsection. Note that the property is a slight modification of the property presented here, where instead of the first use we write use(exclusive), instead of free we write free(exclusive) and instead of the second use we write use(.#) which stands for both exclusive and shared access to the resource. In other words, there need not be changed much in the properties to employ the automatic verification from one iteration of the code to the next.

8 Conclusions

In this paper we have discussed an approach to developing verified Erlang code. This paper is an extended version of the contribution to FMICS [2], where an earlier iteration of the resource manager is described. In this paper we focus on the iteration of the resource manager as we have described for FME [3], with two types of access to resources. Compared to the FME contribution, we describe the construction of the tool in more detail and focus on the support for the development process.

As commented earlier, there are a number of approaches to verifying code. For example, a formal development process might start with a formal specification and use verified refinement steps in order to produce code compliant with the original specification. The development process our work fits into is different on a number of fronts. First, we are working in a context of an established process which makes full use of software libraries that have been extensively tested. Second, we wish our verification to sit alongside the standard coding and testing of the Erlang components and to use verification to check key properties of the code.

To this extent our approach consists of the following steps. The Erlang code for a component is automatically translated to a process algebraic specification written in μCRL. We then generate a labelled transition system (LTS) from this μCRL specification by using components of the μCRL toolset. The properties of interest are then written in the logic of the model checker we use, here we use the regular alternating-free μ-calculus to express non-starvation and mutual exclusion. The labelled transition system is then checked against this property using the CÆSAR/ALDEBARAN toolset. For some properties it is necessary to transform the LTS (e.g., using hiding for non-starvation) so that we can model check with a simpler formulation of the property of interest (e.g., one without alternating fixed points).

The case study we discussed in this paper was drawn from a critical part of the AXD 301 software consisting of about 250 lines of Erlang code, which implements a resource locking problem for which we prove properties such as mutual exclusion and non-starvation. Although we re-implemented the software to substantially simplify the code, the principles underlying the code we used are exactly the same as those in the actual switch code. In the code of the resource manager in the AXD 301 both the resource manager and a leader election protocol are combined. We separated these two concepts and concentrated on a clean implementation of both. In this paper we have described the resource locker code. We used the same design principles, coding style and libraries as were used in the production code. Even the names of variables and functions are the same in our implementation as in the original software.

Our approach has advantages and disadvantages. The ability to automate many aspects of the process is one of the key advantages, however, we currently have to fix the number of clients and resources per verification. Tackling this issue, and determining how to verify properties for arbitrary numbers of clients and resources without a crippling performance overload, is ongoing work. Relevant to this might be the use of theorem proving, since the Erlang theorem prover can be used to prove similar properties, in particular if one uses the extra layer of semantics for software components added to the proof rules [5]. However, such a proof has to be provided manually, and this contrasts with the ability to automate, which is an advantage of model checking. However, with a theorem prover one can reason about sets of configurations at once, and not fix the number of clients and resources per attempt. Integrating the two approaches might offer some combined benefits.

The translation of Erlang into μCRL that we discussed above is performed automatically, and is sufficiently robust so that it can deal with a large enough part of the language to make it applicable to serious examples. Although the tool which calculates the state spaces for μCRL models [11] is advanced and stable, it still takes of the order of a few minutes up to several hours to generate a state space. Once the model is generated model checking is relatively quick: with the CÆSAR/ALDEBARAN toolset takes only a few seconds up to a few minutes. This comparative difference is partly due to the computation on the complex data structures we have in our algorithm.

Some further optimisations could be envisaged. In some cases it is unnecessary to generate the whole state space, for example when the property of interest does not hold. A collaboration between both providers of the external tools recently resulted in an on-the-fly model checker to overcome this inconvenience. At the same time a distributed state space generation and model checking tool are being built as cooperation between CWI and Aachen University [8]. With such a tool, a cluster of machines can be used to quickly analyse rather large state spaces. Experiments showed that an LTS with 20 million states would be generated in a few hours.

All of this work points to a situation where the formal verification of Erlang programs is slowly becoming practically possible, particularly for the development of new programs [2]. An experiment with using the tool to develop the scheduler software for a video-on-demand server underwrites this [6]. Further work that we are undertaking includes the extension of our translation tool to cover more components and to deal with fault tolerance. At the moment, crashing and restarting of processes is not considered inside the μCRL model, so that properties about the fault tolerance behaviour cannot be expressed. In the near future we plan to verify more software and construct a library of verified Erlang programs that can be used within Ericsson products.
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