

Toward Architecture-based Reliability Estimation

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Motivation


- Software reliability: probability that the system performs its intended functionality without failure
- Software reliability techniques aim at reducing or eliminating failure of software systems
- Complimentary to *testing*, rely on implementation
- **How one goes about building reliable systems?
And how to measure early reliability?**


Software Architecture

- High-level abstractions describing
 - Structure, Behavior, Constraints
- Coarse-grain building blocks, promote separation of concerns, reuse
 - Components, Connectors, Interfaces, Configurations
- Architectural decisions directly affect aspects of software dependability
 - Reliability
- ADLs, Formal modeling notations, related analysis
 - Often lack *quantification* and *measurement*


Architectural Reliability

- Lightly explored
- Require availability of implementation to:
 - Build behavioral model of the software system
 - Obtain individual component's reliability
- Software architecture offers compositional approaches to modeling, and analysis
- The challenge is *quantifying* these results
 - Presence of uncertainty
 - Unknown operational profile
 - Improper behavior






Component Reliability



The *Quartet*

1. *Interface* models specify the points by which a component interacts with other components in a system
2. *Static behavior* models describe the functionality of a component discretely, i.e., at particular “snapshots” during the system’s execution
3. *Dynamic behavior* models provide a continuous view of *how* a component arrives at different states throughout its execution
4. *Interaction protocol* models provide an *external* view of the component and how it may legally interact with other components in the system



INTERFACES

```

PROV gas(val : SpeedType): SpeedType;
PROV brake(val : SpeedType): SpeedType;
PROV cruise(speed: SpeedType); Boolean;

```

STATIC BEHAVIOR

STATE-VAR:

```

curSpeed: SpeedType;
isCruising: Boolean;

```

INVARIANT:

```

0 ≤ curSpeed ≤ MAX;

```


OPERATIONS:

```


gas.preCond (val > 0);
gas.postCond (~curSpeed = curSpeed + val);
brake.preCond (val < 0);
brake.postCond (~curSpeed = curSpeed + val
                AND isCruising = false);
cruise.preCond (speed > 0);
cruise.postCond (~curSpeed = speed
                AND isCruising = true);


```

DYNAMIC BEHAVIOR





INTERACTION PROTOCOLS






Component Reliability






— Syntactic

— Semantic




Component Reliability



Defect Quantification

- Architectural defects could affect system Reliability
- Different defects affect the Reliability differently
 - e.g., interface mismatch vs. protocol mismatch
- The cost of mitigation of defects varies based on the defect type
- Other (domain specific) factors may affect the quantification
- **Classification + Cost framework**

Classification + Cost Framework




- Pluggable/Adaptable
- Identify the important factors within a domain
- For a defect class t


$$c_t = G(\vec{\theta}(t), f), \text{ where}$$

$$\vec{\theta}(t) = [\theta_1(t), \theta_2(t), \dots, \theta_n(t)]$$

- f : Frequency of occurrence
- And $\vec{\theta}(t)$ vector of all relevant factors
- Result will be used in reliability estimation



Component Reliability



Reliability Techniques

- Non-Homogenous Poisson Processes, Binomial Models, Software Reliability Growth Models, ...
- Markovian Models
 - Suited to architectural approaches
 - Considers system's structure, compositional
 - Stochastic processes
 - Informally, a finite state machine extended with transition probabilities

Our Reliability Model

- Built based on the *dynamic behavioral model*
 - Assume Markov property (Discrete Time Markov Chains)
 - Transition probabilities maybe unknown
 - Complex behavior results in lack of a correspondence between events and states
 - Event/action pairs to describe components' interaction
- ➔ **Augmented Hidden Markov Models (AHMM)**

Evaluation

- Uncertainty analysis
 - Operational profile
 - Incorrect behavior
- Sensitivity analysis
 - Traditional Markov-based sensitivity analysis combined with the defect quantification
- Complexity
- Scalability

Conclusion and Future Work

- Step toward closing the gap between architectural specification and its effect on system's reliability
- Handles two types of uncertainties associated with early reliability estimation
- Preliminary results are promising
- Need further evaluation
- Build compositional models to estimate system reliability based on estimated component reliabilities

Questions?